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FOLLOWING DIGITAL MEDIA INTO THE COURTROOM:
PUBLICITY AND THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Shauna Hall-Coates*

ABSTRACT
Despite the pervasive integration of technology into various social institutions,
one public body—the courtroom—has largely resisted such efforts. This
separation is collapsing, however, as trial spectators increasingly arrive at court
expecting to use their handheld digital devices inside to publish information
about trials in real-time on live-blogging platforms. Consequently, Canadian
courts have been forced to grapple with what role, if any, digital media is to
play within their walls as this new information age puts pressure on a centuriesold legal tradition.
This article examines the debate on the use of digital devices in the
courtroom from the perspective of the “open court principle,” as articulated
in both law and general jurisprudential theory. It argues that using digital media
as a platform to disseminate courtroom narratives has the potential to
strengthen many of the open court principle’s foundational values, including
accessibility, judicial accountability, and freedom of speech. These benefits
may nonetheless come at a cost to the open court’s normative functions, since
multiple, non-linear courtroom narratives created by digital media can
undermine the publication of clear, determinate norms around which people
can structure their lives. Accordingly, this article suggests that in deciding
whether to permit digital media use in the courtroom, the justice system must
determine which of the democratic values that underpin the open court
principle ought to be given decisive weight in modern society.
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INTRODUCTION
An incontrovertible truth of the modern age is that technology has been,
and will undoubtedly continue to be, one of the defining characteristics of 21st
century life. In Canada, individuals increasingly live their lives with the Internet
literally at their fingertips, as the proliferation of digital technologies in
increasingly diminutive forms has made it possible to stay connected at any time
and from any location. Yet despite the pervasive integration of technology into
various social institutions, one dimension of civil society—the courtroom—has
remained relatively immune from technology’s noisy demands for recognition.
Walk into any courtroom today, critics venture, and it will look stunningly similar
to those of the past; the judge will be sitting behind the bench, the jury in its box,
and the witness on the stand.1 As everyone settles into his or her place selected
by centuries of ritual and status quo, the courtroom may even appear as a
sanctuary from the trappings of digital technology, so doggedly pursued outside
its walls.
This segregation between the courtroom and digital technology is
nonetheless collapsing, as trial spectators increasingly arrive to court expecting
that they will be able to use their digital devices inside to publish information
about the trial in real-time through social media such as Twitter and other liveblogging platforms. Moreover, despite the judicial system’s wariness of digital
media technologies, their integration into the courtroom is strongly supported on
the basis of the “open court” principle—that venerated ideal within the English
justice system that holds court proceedings must be open to the public and that
publicity as to those proceedings must be unconstrained. As a result, courts across
Canada have been forced to grapple with what role, if any, digital media
technology is to play within the modern casting of the open court principle, and
who, if anyone, is given recourse to its use in the courtroom.
Entering this critical fray, this article examines the debate on both sides of
the coin for the inclusion and exclusion of digital devices and the attendant use
of social media within the courtroom, based primarily on its accordance with the
1

Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media” (Speech
delivered at Carleton University, 31 January 2012), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/spedis/bm-2012-01-31-eng.aspx>.

Vol. 24

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

103

theoretical and legal underpinnings of the open court principle as they exist at the
level of both Canadian law and general jurisprudential theory. At its root, this
article rejects critics’ suggestion that social media use within the courtroom merely
acts as the 21st century equivalent of the reporter’s pen and paper, and thus does
not represent a radical break from past journalistic practices. On the contrary, this
article argues that these platforms create wholly new and challenging courtroom
narratives, characterized by the immediacy, interactivity, abundance, and
permanence of the information disseminated through them. Likewise, since the
Internet has democratized information dissemination, these courtroom narratives
may be increasingly relayed in jurisdictions where it is permitted, such as Nova
Scotia, by anonymous civilians who remain deeply unaccountable to a
professional or organizational body in a manner commensurate with the
accredited media.
Accordingly, the revolutionary nature of this information dissemination
platform exposes both digital media’s promises and problems in relation to the
normative values that support the open court principle. The normative values
underpinning the open court principle are complex, and deliberation on them is
found in canonical Supreme Court of Canada case law, as well as in the writings
of legal philosophers and critics such as Jeremy Bentham, Lon L. Fuller, and
Jeremy Waldron. Distilled to their bare essence, the values of the open court
principle centre on the self-legitimization of the judicial system in a democratic
system of governance and the self-determination of individuals in a functioning
democracy. This latter value involves the dual-pronged ability of citizens to selfgovern according to a clear understanding of their legal entitlements and
obligations within a democratic order, while simultaneously being free to publicly
question the efficacy and legitimacy of these same laws to which they know that
they are coercively beholden.
Using digital media as a platform to disseminate courtroom narratives has
the potential to strengthen many of the open court principle’s foundational
values, including accessibility, accountability of the judiciary, and freedom of
speech. However, even as digital publicity in all its multiple, non-linear narratives
has the profound ability to increase discursive debate, it undermines the
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publication of clear, determinate norms around which people can structure their
lives. This argument is heavily steeped in humans’ troublesome online truthseeking practices and in critics’ suggestions that digital media is a constant, and
perhaps unavoidable, purveyor of misinformation in society. Accordingly, this
article suggests that in deciding whether to integrate digital media use within the
courtroom, the justice system must determine which of the democratic values
that underpin the open court principle ought to be given decisive weight in
modern society. Once the judicial door has been opened to use of digital media,
it is legally and practically difficult to close the door, given that the test to obtain
a common law publication ban is onerous, and cries of censorship target judges
who refuse to accommodate the multiplicity of perspectives that social media’s
proponents celebrate. Consequently, the wariness of some Canadian courts to
welcome digital media technology into their fold may be prudent in light of this
technology’s capacity to problematize fulfillment of the very core values they hold
as sacrosanct.

I. THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE AND PUBLICITY OF LAW
In any constitutional climate, the administration of justice
thrives on exposure to light—and withers under a cloud of secrecy.
—JUSTICE FISH IN TORONTO STAR NEWSPAPERS LTD V ONTARIO2

A.

The Open Court Principle and the Integrity of the Justice System

At its crux, the open court principle holds that the public is to enjoy free
access to the courts of justice and is presumptively entitled to attend and observe
any court hearing.3 The open court principle is often said to rest on the maxim
that justice can “only be truly done if it is seen to be done.”4 Legal philosophy
has long drawn this connection between the concept of justice and the value of
transparency, insisting that the former is meaningless without the latter.5
2

Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, 2005 SCC 41 at para 1, [2005] SCR 188 [Toronto Star].

3

McLachlin, supra note 1.

4

R v Sussex Justice, [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259.

5

The open court principle is said to have received rhetorical support from legal scholars like Sir Matthew
Hale, William Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham: see e.g. Allen M Linden, “Limitations on Media Coverage
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Throughout history, theorists including 19th century English philosopher Jeremy
Bentham were skeptical of the court system because it was, and is, the sole arm
of democratic government not held publicly accountable through the electoral
process.6 Insistence that the courts remain open to public scrutiny thus
functioned as a check on what would otherwise be the untrammeled and
unaccountable exercise of power by unelected judges.7
Capturing this sentiment, Bentham wrote in an oft-quoted passage,
In the darkness of secrecy, sinister intent and evil in every shape have
full swing. Only in proportions as publicity has place can the checks
applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity,
there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest
spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against probity. It keeps
the judge himself while trying under trial.8

Implicit in Bentham’s words is the aforementioned maxim that holds justice rests
on public perception, as the legitimacy of judicial power arises from the public’s
collective confidence in the legal system’s capacity to serve as an impartial and
independent arbiter of rights. The Supreme Court of Canada wrote these
observations into law in Vancouver Sun (Re), noting,
Openness is necessary to maintain the independence and impartiality
of courts. It is integral to public confidence in the justice system and
the public’s understanding of the administration of justice. Moreover,
openness is a principal component of the legitimacy of the judicial
process and why the parties and the public at large abide by the
decisions of courts.9

of Legal Proceedings: A Critique and Some Proposals for Reform” in Phillip Anisman & Allen M Linden,
eds, The Media, The Courts and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 302.
6

Hon CJ Marilyn Warren, “Open Justice in the Technological Age” (2013) 40 Monash UL Rev 45 at 46.

7

Ibid. Likewise, in Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushnell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall
LJ 75 at 77, the authors note that under the Charter judges “neither elected to their offices nor accountable
for their actions are vested with the power to strike down laws that have been made by the duly elected
representatives of the people.” Concern for the legitimacy of judiciary in the face of its amplified
democratic power in the post-Charter era may be correspondingly said to be particularly acute.

8

Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, ed, John Stuart Mill (Edinburg: Bowring, 1827) at 355.

9

Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43 at para 25, [2004] 2 SCR 332.

106

DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM

Vol. 24

Publicity is therefore a critical component of the justice system’s claim to
legitimacy because it makes the judiciary itself worthy of standing as a democratic
institution, despite its exclusion from an electoral process that normally mediates
the relationship between citizens and the state.10
Although the open court principle protects the self-legitimizing interests of
the justice system, it also protects the right of citizens to receive a fair trial under
section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.11 Crucially, a closed
court system runs the risk that parties who wield social or political power,
including the government, could use it to “circumvent public policies,
accountability, and basic notions of procedural fairness.”12 Concern for the abuse
of the administration of justice is particularly acute in the criminal law context
where a prosecuting government threatens an accused’s constitutionally
protected liberty interests with infinitely larger resources at its disposal.13
Publicity, once again, steps into frame as a mechanism to safeguard
procedural integrity, as Bentham noted that having a trial conducted in public
view compels judges to ensure justice is properly administered in their
courtrooms to avoid public accusations of incompetence or impropriety.14 In R v
Legal Aid Board, Lord Woolf of the English Court of Appeal summed up this
sentiment in similar terms:
[The open court principle] enables the public to know that justice is
being administered impartially. It can result in evidence becoming
available which would not become available if the proceedings were
conducted behind closed doors or with one or more of the parties’ or
witnesses’ identity concealed. […] If secrecy is restricted to those
situations where justice would be frustrated if the cloak of anonymity
is not provided, this reduces the risk of the sanction of contempt

10

Warren, supra note 6 at 46.

11

David M Paciocco, “When Open Courts Meet Closed Government” (2005) 2 Sup Ct L Rev 385 at 387.

12

Trevor C Farrow, “Public Justice, Private Dispute Resolution and Democracy” (2008) Comparative
Research in Law & Political Economy, Research Paper No 18/2008 at 49, online: <digitalcommons.
osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/192>.

13

Dana Adams, “Access Denied? Inconsistent Jurisprudence on the Open Court Principle and Media Access
to Exhibits in Canadian Criminal Cases” (2012) 49 Alta L Rev 177 at 180.

14

Warren, supra note 6 at 46.
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having to be invoked, with the expense and the interference with the
administration of justice which this can involve.15

In this way, the open court principle defends the interests of the accused by
ensuring procedural protections are granted, including adherence to the principles
of natural justice, while keeping the judicial players—the judge, jury, and
counsel—“intellectually honest” by guaranteeing their actions are a matter of
public record.16
B.

Freedom of Information: Autonomy and Public Discourse

As David Paciocco notes, the concept of open court is misleading if it is
thought of simply in terms of enabling the public’s physical “access to [the] woodpaneled rooms” of the courthouse.17 Although the “first facet” of open court is
the public’s right to attend trials and court proceedings,18 the principle is
fundamentally an expansive liberty doctrine that covers the public’s freedom to
access and disseminate information about the law, including judicial
proceedings.19 The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly recognized this
informational freedom as fundamental to the fair functioning of the legal system
and to the democratic system of governance as a whole. In Named Person v
Vancouver Sun, Justice Bastarache wrote:
Information is at the heart of any legal system. Police investigate crimes
and act on information they acquire; lawyers and witnesses present
information to courts; juries and judges make decisions based on that
information; and those decisions, reported by the popular and legal
press, make up the basis of the law in future cases. In Canada, as in any
truly democratic society, the courts are expected to be open, and information is
expected to be available to the public.20

15

R v Legal Aid Board, ex parte Kaim Todner (a firm), [1999] QB 966 at para 4 (CA).

16

Willard Z Estey, “Freedom of Expression vs The Individual’s Right to Privacy,” (Speech delivered at the
Empire Club of Canada, Toronto, 21 April 1994) in The Empire Club of Canada: Addresses 1993–1994
(Toronto: The Empire Club of Canada, 1994) 412 at 426.

17

Paciocco, supra note 11 at 388.

18

Vickery v Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), [1991] 1 SCR 671 at para 49, 104 NSR (2d) 181 [Vickery].

19

Paciocco, supra note 11 at 388.

20

Named Person v Vancouver Sun, 2007 SCC 43 at para 1, [2007] 3 SCR 253 [emphasis added].
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Hence, whereas the first facet of the open court principle underscores the
physical permeability of the courthouse, its second facet underscores its
conceptual permeability, as information originating inside the courthouse flows
outward into full public view under this doctrine. In practical terms, this
“common law right of access” means that any non-privileged information that a
court receives or produces should be available to the public,21 including any
“material that is relevant to [a court proceeding’s] resolution.”22 While accounts
of witness testimony, interim deliberations, and final judgments are all made a
matter of public record in the name of this principle, evidence relied upon during
a court proceeding, including executed search warrants23 and trial exhibits,24 is
also made available to the public on this basis.
By protecting freedom of information, the open court principle
fundamentally enables the public to achieve two interrelated, democratic social
values. Firstly, the publicity of legal information informs citizens as to the extent
of their legal rights and obligations.25 This knowledge enables people to
understand how the justice system might deal with future legal issues arising from
their rights, should they ever find themselves facing a court of law.26 Secondly,
armed with this knowledge, citizens can publically question the efficacy and
legitimacy of these laws to which they now know they are coercively beholden.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Mentuck illustrates this point
by focusing on the twin values of self-governance and public discourse borne out
of the open court principle.27 In Mentuck, an accused murderer was arrested after
the RCMP conducted an undercover “Mr. Big” sting operation. This policing
method remains controversial because it induces self-conscription of criminal
suspects at the hands of the state.28 Fearing that public knowledge of the
operational methods employed by the officers would undermine the effectiveness
21

Vickery, supra note 18 at para 77.

22

Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41 at para 1, 211 DLR (4th) 193.

23

Nova Scotia (AG) v MacIntyre, [1982] 1 SCR 175, 49 NSR (2d) 609.

24

Canadian Broadcasting Corp v R, 2010 ONCA 726, 102 OR (3d) 673.

25

Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para 10, 103 AR 321 [Edmonton Journal].

26

Ibid.

27

R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 SCR 76 [Mentuck].

28

See e.g. R v Hart, 2014 SCC 52, [2014] 2 SCR 544.
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of future investigations, the prosecutors sought a publication ban to suppress this
information. The Supreme Court unanimously denied this request, stating that
the public airing of these techniques was vital to public edification and
deliberation. Writing for the Court, Justice Iacobucci stated:
As this Court recognized in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)
[citations omitted], “participation in social and political decisionmaking is to be fostered and encouraged” [as] a principle fundamental
to a free and democratic society. […] Such participation is an empty
exercise without the information…about the practices of government,
including the police. In my view, a publication ban that restricts the
public’s access to information about the one government body that
publicly wields instruments of force and gathers evidence for the
purpose of imprisoning suspected offenders would have a serious
deleterious effect. There is no doubt as to how crucial the role of the
police is to the maintenance of law and order and the security of
Canadian society. But there has always been and will continue to be a
concern about the limits of acceptable police action. The improper use
of bans regarding police conduct, so as to insulate that conduct from
public scrutiny, seriously deprives the Canadian public of its ability to
know of and be able to respond to police practices that, left unchecked,
could erode the fabric of Canadian society and democracy.29

Elsewhere in the judgment, Justice Iacobucci underscored the deliberative
function of informational freedom, noting that a ban on the information
fundamentally “prevents the public from being informed critics of what may be
controversial police actions.”30 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
reveals its self-perceived obligation to provide the public with the information
necessary to enable individuals to organize their thought, behaviour, and speech
around the state’s coercive powers. The open court principle thus plays an
essential function in the democratic order by educating the public on their legal
rights, while simultaneously facilitating public discussion regarding the nature and
limit of these civic entitlements and obligations.
Pushing the analysis of these dual democratic functions of the open court
system further, Lon L. Fuller’s naturalist account of law in The Morality of the Law
(1964) highlights the value of legal transparency by grounding it in a relationship
29

Mentuck, supra note 27 at para 51.

30

Ibid at para 50 [emphasis added].

110

DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM

Vol. 24

of reciprocity between the lawmaker and the legal subject. In Fuller’s account of
the law, citizens are not simply members of a submissive population, blindly
following the will of the state.31 Instead, they are legal agents capable of purposive
action in society and ordered by law as a distinctive mode of governance separate
and apart from rule by men.32 As a mode of governance, law crucially presupposes
legal subjects’ agency and communicates both recognition and respect for law by
constituting itself in full observance of eight intrinsic, formal attributes, which
Fuller describes as the law’s “internal morality.”33 Among Fuller’s eight canons is
the formal principle of “clarity” or “publicity,” which holds that laws must be
made public to citizens in a meaningful way.34 Publicity consequently demands
that the state govern with clear and determinate legal norms that are not kept
“hidden away in the closets of bureaucracy”35 or contained within the shadows
of deliberate state obfuscation.36
Although The Morality of the Law includes few references to courtroom
procedure,37 Fuller’s concept of publicity emphasizes the values of selfgovernance and deliberative democracy that publicity makes possible in a manner
that both echoes and deepens the Supreme Court’s analysis of the open court
principle in Mentuck. In order to appreciate what Fuller brings to the debate over
the use of digital media in Canadian courtrooms, first one must understand that
a profound sense of reciprocity exists between the legal subject and the lawmaker
in Fuller’s account of the law. As a result, for the law to be law it must convey
itself to legal subjects in a formal manner that recognizes the subject’s capacity
31

Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012) 1
at 2.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid.

35

Jeremy Waldron, “The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure” (2010) New York University Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 234 at 1, online: <lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/234>.

36

Critics including David Dyzenhaus have pointed out that Fuller’s account of publicity involves a moral
requirement on the part of the lawmaker to engaged in reasoned justification of the law’s content; see e.g.
David Dyzenhaus, “The Rule of Law as the Rule of Liberal Principle” in Ronald Dworkin, ed, Arthur
Ripstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 74. This supposition accords with Fuller’s
position that when individuals are compelled to explain and justify their decisions the effect is to “pull
these them towards goodness”; see “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart” (1950)
71 Harv L Rev 630 at 636. An analysis of reasoned justification in Fuller’s work is beyond the scope of this
article, but it is worth underscoring that Fuller’s concept of publicity has received a series of varied
jurisprudential interpretations given its evocative and indeterminate nature.

37

Waldron, supra note 35 at 8.
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for self-governance, free from direct state intervention.38 Moreover, in providing
discursive space for the self-application of its norms, the law demonstrates
respect for individuals’ inherent human dignity as beings capable of selfdetermination and self-control.39 Fuller writes:
To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to rules
involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can
become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following
rules and answerable for his defaults. Every departure from the
principles of law’s morality is an affront to man’s dignity as a
responsible agent. To judge his actions by unpublished or retrospective
laws, or to order him to do an act that is impossible, is to convey…your
indifference to his powers of self-determination.40

As the law constitutes itself in recognition of humans’ capacity for selfgovernance, it operates “by using, rather than short-circuiting, the agency of
ordinary human individuals. [It] count[s] on people’s capacities for practical
understanding, for self-control, for self-monitoring and modulation of their own
behavio[u]r in relation to norms that they can grasp and understand.”41
Correspondingly, it is only when the law constitutes itself in a formal manner that
affirms its commitment to human autonomy that individuals gain a reciprocal
obligation to recognize the law as law and follow its demands.42
Since law constitutes itself based on a “dignitarian conception of the legal
subject as an agent capable of monitoring and freely governing his [or her] own
conduct,”43 publicity is valued for providing citizens with clear, determinative

38

Waldron points out that citizens’ obedience to law is rarely the result of physical coercion, as litigants often
pay court awards without the intervention of bailiffs and criminally accused persons show up to court on
their own recognizance: see Jeremy Waldron, “How Law Protects Dignity” (2012) 71:1 Cambridge LJ 200
at 206.

39

Fuller is not alone in linking the law’s determinative content with the recognition of human autonomy.
Joseph Raz similarly wrote in “The Value of the Rule of Law,” “[o]bservance of the rule of law is
necessary if the law is to respect human dignity. Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as
persons capable of planning and plotting their future. Thus, respecting people’s dignity includes respecting
their autonomy, their right to control their future”: see e.g. “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in The
Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (UK: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 221.

40

Lon Fuller, Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) at 162.

41

Waldron, supra note 35 at 206.

42

Rundle, supra note 31 at 3.

43

Waldron, supra note 35 at 18.
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legal norms around which to structure their lives.44 At its crux, publicity lends
stability and reliability to citizens’ lives insofar as they are able to anticipate the
legal outcomes of their actions.45 The freedom enjoyed on the basis of publicity
has consequently been termed a private one, as legal clarity, determinacy, and
predictability offer individuals the personal freedom to pursue a course of
conduct by reference to their calculation of its legal risks and rewards.46 As a
result, critics have held that the clear articulation of law’s normative content is
vital to the rule of law, insofar as it provides certainty to the lives of citizens while
simultaneously conveying respect for their powers of self-determination.47
Individualistic self-governance aside, the publicity of law has additionally
been cited by critics as having a broader, more collective social function in a
democratic order. Within this critical fray, Jeremy Waldron criticizes
interpretation of Fuller’s formalist principles as relating solely to self-governance
at the expense of collective action.48 In “The Rule of Law and the Importance of
Procedure,” Waldron disapproves of a simplistic account of law as determinate
content, dispatched by the sovereign for public edification and obedience. He
writes, “[the] fallacy of modern positivism, it seems to me, is its exclusive
emphasis on the command-and-control aspect of law, or the norm-and-guidance
aspect of law, without any reference to the culture of argument that a legal system
frames, sponsors and institutionalizes.”49
For Waldron, the law is not simply a source of inflexible and entrenched
command, but “a matter of argument” in and of itself.50 Put differently, the law
is not simply determined by a judge and passed down to the subject from on high.
Rather, the law is fundamentally shaped in and beyond the courtroom when
…ordinary people and their representatives take advantage of [the legal
system’s] aspiration to systematicity and integrity in framing their own
legal arguments…. These are not just arguments about what the law
ought to be—made, as it were, in a sort of lobbying mode. They are
44

Colleen Murphy, “Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Moral of Law” (2004) 24 Law & Phil 239 at 241.

45

Ibid.

46

Waldron, supra note 35 at 18.

47

Ibid.

48

Ibid at 20.

49

Ibid.

50

Ibid at 17.
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arguments of reason presenting competing arguments about what the
law is. Inevitably, they are controversial: one party will say that suchand-such a proposition cannot be inferred from the law as it is; the
other party will respond that it can be so inferred if only we credit the
law with more coherence…. And so the determination of whether
such a proposition has legal authority may often be a matter of
contestation.51

According to Waldron, recognizing that the law is the site of civic contestation
and resistance to dominant interpretations underscores a second dignitarian
aspect of law, as it conceives of
…people who live under [law] as bearers of reason and intelligence.
They are thinkers who can grasp and grapple with the rationale of the
way they are governed and relate it in complex but intelligible ways to
their own view of the relation between their actions and purposes and
the actions and purposes of the state.52

As laws are the subject of constant interpretation and debate, legal publicity serves
a discursive function in democratic society by enabling “active engagement in the
administration of public affairs, the freedom to participate actively and
argumentatively in the way that one is governed.”53 Public institutions are thus
compelled under this democratic concept of the law—as the Supreme Court
appeared to identify in Mentuck—to “sponsor and facilitate reasoned argument in
human affairs.”54 Ultimately, as publicity of the law lends predictability, stability,
and determinacy to human lives by revealing its positive content in the eyes of
the sovereign, it simultaneously subjects these laws “to scrutiny and opens them
to public criticism, political demonstrations, active and passive resistance, and
friction.”55

51

Ibid [emphasis in original].

52

Ibid [emphasis in original].

53

Ibid at 18.

54

Ibid.

55

David Luban, “The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Reexamining Fuller’s Canons” (2010) 2 Hague J on
Rule L 29 at 35. Moreover, in Part IV of this article we will see how publicity as defined legal content and
deliberative legal discourse can come into tension with one another through the involvement of digital
media in the courtroom.
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Freedom of Speech and the Open Court Principle

Each aspect of the open court principle discussed above, including its
preservation of physical access to the courtroom and the promotion of
informational freedom in the service of self-governance and deliberative
discourse, converge with its constitutional protection in the freedom of
expression guarantee under section 2(b) of the Charter. Section 2(b) guarantees
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the
press and other media of communication.56 The protection of a free press within
section 2(b) is vital to the functioning of the open court principle because, despite
jurisprudential veneration, it is widely accepted that few Canadians have the time,
resources, or will to attend court personally.57 Open in principle but closed as a
matter of practicality, the justice system eludes its transparency promise without
the intervention of an intermediary dedicated to the dissemination of legal
information.
The mass media, with its traditional hegemonic control over channels of
information access and distribution, thus became the purveyor of legal
information regarding court proceedings. In Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG), the
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the open court principle’s sustenance
through media involvement:
Those who cannot attend rely in large measure upon the press to
inform them about court proceedings—the nature of the evidence that
was called, the arguments presented, the comments made by the trial
judge—in order to know not only what rights they may have, but how
their problems might be dealt with in court. […] Discussion of court
cases and constructive criticism of court proceedings is dependent
upon the receipt by the public of information as to what transpired in
court. Practically speaking, this information can only be obtained from the
newspapers or other media.58
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Acting as the public’s “proxy”59 or “surrogate”60 in the courtroom, the media
gathers the information necessary for public self-governance and deliberation,
while simultaneously policing the administration of justice to prevent abuse by
judicial actors.61
Since it is “through the press that the vitally important concept of the open
court is preserved,”62 the freedom of expression guarantee under section 2(b) has
come to explicitly protect the role of the press in gaining access to court
proceedings. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (AG), Justice La Forest
stated:
That the right of the public to information relating to court
proceedings, and the corollary right to put forward opinions pertaining
to the courts, depend on the freedom of the press to transmit this
information is fundamental to an understanding of the importance of
that freedom. The full and fair discussion of public institutions, which
is vital to any democracy, is the raison d’être of the s. 2(b) guarantees.
Debate in the public domain is predicated on an informed public,
which is in turn reliant upon a free and vigorous press. The public’s
entitlement to be informed imposes on the media the responsibility to inform fairly
and accurately. This responsibility is especially grave given that the
freedom of the press is, and must be, largely unfettered.63

Honing in on the press’ unfettered access to the courts, this guarantee
encompasses not only the right to transmit news, information and beliefs, but the
right to gather this information “independent from any state imposed restrictions
on content, form or perspective except those justified under s. 1 of the Charter.”64
Under section 2(b), the public is also granted the reciprocal right to demand and
receive information regarding court proceedings from the media, which in turn
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will form the content of their own constitutionally protected free speech. Again
in Canadian Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (AG), Justice La Forest held:
Openness permits public access to information about the courts,
which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions
and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom
to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is
clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is
the right of members of the public to obtain information about the
courts in the first place.65

Put another way, section 2(b) protects “listeners” and “speakers,” both of whom
have an equal right to claim unfettered access to information, even if such
information is learned second-hand, and to discuss it freely.66 Ultimately, without
the twinned protection of freedom of access and expression under section 2(b),
the open court principle would be stifled in all its democratic aims.

II. DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE MODERN COURTROOM
The evening news has become men in suits and women in pearls reading Twitter to your grandparents.
Twitter is faster than print media, more in depth than television, and compared to traditional newswire,
it’s real-time reaction to events, news, and headlines.67
—BARRY RITHOLTZ

A.

Publicity and Mass Media in the Modern Age

In the modern age, the open court principle is undergoing a marked
transformation as technology has come to saturate all levels of society, causing
vital aspects of human activity—including human communication and the mass
media—to acquire a digital dimension.68 Humans live in an era in which
information production, distribution, and storage have migrated online. Once
65
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online, information is disseminated at a scale and rate hitherto unachievable in a
strictly paper-based information economy.69 In this digital community,
individuals can not only access vast amounts of information in mere seconds, but
can also connect to almost anyone, at any time, from any location.70 The manner
in which communication, connectivity, and access to information is sought has
thus transformed, as individuals are increasingly connected via a global network
that transcends temporal and geographic borders. The expansive nature of this
global information network is, paradoxically, matched by the diminutive nature
of the technology through which it is accessed, as humans increasingly come to
understand their world through portable electronic devices no larger than a
human hand.
As a result of the proliferation of digital technology and social media
platforms, more people are producing and disseminating media content today
than ever before in human history.71 With the increased supply of digital media
content comes increased demand. As scholar Christina Locke Faubel explains,
“[m]obile technologies such as smartphones and laptops enable instant, ondemand news, and as the public rapidly adopts these technologies, the media
works to supply coverage as quickly as possible.”72 Facing economic and cultural
strains and a surge of digital readership, traditional mass media have increasingly
ventured online in order to compete in the digital marketplace.73 However, the
democratizing nature of the Internet has also simultaneously “blurred the lines
between the traditional news media and regular citizens, as [I]nternet access and
software make it possible for a single person, with very low overhead, to create
content that is available globally.”74 Since anyone can now gain instant publicity
online, individuals with no formal media affiliation or credentials are able to break
69

Ibid.

70

Hon Amy J St Eve & Michael A Zuckerman, “Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of Social Media”
(2012) 11 Duke L & Tech Rev 1 at 3.

71

Karen Salaz, Thomas Hodson & Chris J Davey, “New Media and the Courts: The Current Status and a
Look at the Future” (2010), online: CCPIO <www.ssrn.com/abstract=1666332>.

72

Christina Locke Faubel, “Cameras in the Courtroom 2.0: How Technology is Changing the Way
Journalists Cover the Courts” (2014) 3 Reynolds Ct & Media LJ 3.

73

Mary Kissel, “The Decline of Print Doesn’t Mean the End of Journalism”, The Guardian (29 October
2013), online: The Guardian <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/29/decline-print-mediajournalism-web>.

74

Faubel, supra note 72 at 30.

118

DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM

Vol. 24

news through their digital devices. The fact that the public is now empowered en
masse to report the news was evidenced in 2013 when eyewitnesses of the Boston
Marathon bombing broke news of the incident on Twitter within seconds of its
occurrence. In doing so, these private citizens provided firsthand accounts of the
event in real-time, well before traditional media outlets like CNN, Reuters, or the
Associated Press were on the scene.75
In this way, those armed with technology today assume a role traditionally
reserved for vocational journalists, eroding the mass media’s hegemonic control
as the public’s informational intermediary. Law professor Teresa Scassa notes:
In an age where journalism was largely the province of organized media
outlets, whether in print or broadcast media, journalism could be
associated in an almost elliptical manner with the activities of paid
journalists. Now, in an era in which almost anyone can participate in
collecting and disseminating information without the need for
membership, employment or affiliation with a media outlet or a guild,
the concept of journalistic purposes has been disassociated from a
particular vocation.76

As the Internet has given voice to numerous non-traditional information sources,
so has society seen the rise of “citizen journalists.” These “ordinary users engage
in journalistic practices,” including current affairs-based blogging, photo and
video sharing, and post eyewitness commentary on current events.77 Largely
enabled by free and public online platforms like Twitter, individuals are able to
document events as they unfold in real-time, and disseminate their observations
to a wide online audience.78 Furthermore, along with the novel medium comes a
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novel narrative style, characterized by speed and a subjective tone of voice that
can challenge those of the mainstream media.79
B.

Digital Media in the Courtroom

Despite technology’s proliferation in other areas of legal practice, critics
charge that up until the 21st century, one “precinct of the law has largely foregone
the use of technology: the normative, near-sacred heart—the courtroom.”80
However, like never before, technology is penetrating the walls of the courtroom
to assert its role within. Media law scholar Cathy Packer explains:
The digital communication revolution has arrived in the nation’s
courtrooms. Journalists and other courtroom observers now head to
court with their smartphones, tablets, and other small computers,
intending to photograph, blog and tweet the events they observe.81

Crucially, social media platforms like Twitter, which enables live reporting from
the courtroom, can be embedded in online newspapers and blogs, widening the
scope of their readership. As Twitter allows individuals to broadcast instant
written accounts of judicial proceedings to infinitely larger online audiences,
tweeting from inside the courtroom has been said to become “de rigueur nowadays
among court reporters […] especially in competitive markets.”82 Similarly, the
President of the Quebec Federation of Journalists recently emphasized the
growing role of digital media in court reporting, arguing that “Twitter is the tool
of the 21st century and it allows journalists to bring the citizen into the
courtroom.”83
Responding to the increasing prevalence of digital media technology in
courtrooms, legal critics have asserted that the practice of live-blogging a
79
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courtroom proceeding is simply the modern equivalent of traditional print
journalism because this written communication does not include video or audio
coverage of the trial, which remain prohibited.84 For example, in her defence of
live-blogging in court, Cathy Packer notes that some in the American judiciary
believe “smartphones and laptop computers [are] the twenty-first century
equivalent of the reporter’s pen and paper—not…the equivalent of
broadcasting.”85 The American Civil Liberties Association echoes this sentiment,
arguing that “tweeting and social media are merely a 21st century version of what
reporters have always done—gather information and disseminate it.”86 Still others
have framed live-blogging’s continuity with journalism of the past in the most
basic of technological terms, explaining that there is no difference between an
individual live-blogging a court proceeding on his or her smartphone and a
“person who walks out of the courtroom, gets on a pay phone, and tells someone
what is going on, and then walks back into the courtroom. That’s the way media
used to do it; this just speeds up the process.”87
These characterizations of Twitter and live-blogging, meant to hold in
abeyance worries that this technology smuggles the prohibited act of broadcasting
into the courtroom, nevertheless fail to capture the profoundly unique aspects of
this mode of publishing. At their core, Twitter and other real-time micro-blogging
services inject radical immediacy into the reporting of courtroom proceedings, as
any sight or speech in the courtroom can be typed and published within
milliseconds of its occurrence by an observer. This technology’s immediacy thus
allows individuals to access virtual “gavel-to-gavel” coverage of the proceeding
unfolding before the observer’s eyes.88
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Moreover, this technology can transmit witness testimony verbatim, easily
typed out in short bursts of Twitter prose. Arguments made by lawyers or
statements uttered by judges may also intersperse this play-by-play narrative,
sometimes juxtaposed with links to photographs of trial exhibits,89 or out-ofcourt videos or images supplied by the author for illustrative purposes.90 These
feeds also describe the appearance, demeanour, and interactions of the parties,
witnesses, and members of the court, capturing what one critic termed a “playful
mix of colo[u]rful details and inane minutiae.”91 The detailed nature of this
information thus turns the trial coverage from an editorial or newspaper article
into a highly augmented transcript, published on the Internet for the world to see.
As a result, certain critics have argued this play-by-play coverage, in its
informational immediacy and volume, offers “an alternative perspective on the
trial” rather than a continuation of past publishing practices.92
Differing from traditional media by virtue of their continuous and
unconstrained streams of information, tweeting and live-blogging diverge from
print media in two more critical respects. Firstly, there is no editorial oversight on
the information being disseminated for non-members of the accredited media.
Critic Adriana Cervantes explains that “[u]nlike judicial opinions, books, articles,
and television, Twitter and live-blogs have no editorial oversight. Anyone with
email and Internet access can tweet about whatever they want, regardless of
validity.”93 As such, trial information that “was once mediated and filtered by
89
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news organizations can be shared peer-to-peer” without any corporate or
organizational oversight.94 Equally, authorial control over this information is
relinquished once it hits the web because, as Mary Long notes, “[a]ttempts to
retract a tweet are pretty pointless. Once it’s out there and endlessly retweeted,
which always happens during live-tweeted happenings, particularly ones involving
death and destruction, there’s no way to go back to every person that tweet has
touched and give them the correct information.”95 As tweets and live-blogs can
be volleyed around endlessly in multiple, non-linear online discussions, they
fundamentally diverge from the largely static narratives of news articles of the
past, which circulated in print within a defined geographic area and were put out
to pasture in archives once the news cycle moved on.
Secondly, as the trajectory of this information is radically unknown, so too
is its fate: it may be “buried in this vast new attention economy if [it] does not
capture the imagination quickly and strongly enough; or [it] may be amplified,
sustained and potentially morphed as [it is] re-circulated, reworked, and reframed
by online networks.”96 Legal scholar Geoffrey Leane underscores this point:
“This is scattered, one-to-many communication as compared to the one-to-one
dialogue of the telephone and few-to-many monologues of mass media. In that
sense it can be more inclusive and simply more ‘public.’”97 Hence, it appears apt
to conclude that, unlike print or editorial news of the past, “[i]n the social media
sphere, news is word of mouth on steroids. It knows no boundaries.”98
Lastly, as the communicative medium has changed, the complexity and
nature of its associated actors are also fundamentally different. The Internet is a
sphere of relative anonymity in which individuals are granted a liberating and
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sometimes toxic99 power to create their own identities as they see fit. In the
context of Twitter, authorial identities are loosely and impersonally defined.
Unlike identity-based services such as Facebook, Twitter does not impose a “real
name” policy that compels users to reveal their true identities. Instead, Twitter
and other micro-blogging services give users the choice as to how they want to
be identified in an effort to aid free speech and association for those who would
otherwise risk being personally linked to a controversial topic or group.100 This
ability to speak anonymously is a clear deviation from traditional editorials or
mass media journalism, where an author’s authority and integrity rests heavily on
his or her byline. Therefore, accountability for one’s speech, characterized by the
risk of identification, reputational harm, and real-life consequences, is often an
absent threat when it comes to using digital media in court.
C.

Electronic Media Policies in Canadian Courtrooms

Turning from the content of live-blogging to the nature of its regulation, the
majority of Canadian provinces and territories have updated their policies on
electronic device use in court since 2012. However, actual policies and procedures
on mobile technology and social media use in Canadian courts can vary greatly
across jurisdictions and levels of court. Crucially, each provincial, territorial, and
federal court may have different rules on the subject, as there is no limit on their
divergence from one another.101 As a result, a “patchwork quilt” of regulation has
developed around the use of digital technologies in the courtroom, making it
difficult to draw definitive conclusions about its normalization in the judicial
context.102
99
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In Canada, courtroom policies on electronic media use differ according to
two key areas of debate. Firstly, policies differ on whether transmitting
information electronically from inside the courtroom to the outside world is
presumptively prohibited but subject to the approval of the presiding judge, or
whether it is presumptively permitted, subject to judicial disapproval in
exceptional circumstances. For example, Quebec has one of the most notorious
blanket bans on electronic device use in its courtrooms. Accredited members of
the media, lawyers, and the public alike are all prohibited from communicating
observations or information from inside the courtroom via electronic media
without the judge’s consent.103 Saskatchewan courts have similarly imposed a
blanket ban on digital media use in the courtroom, unless the court otherwise
permits.104 Under this approach, the accredited media and the general public are
on equal footing when it comes to social media use.
Secondly, even where live-blogging and electronic device use are permitted,
policies differ as to who is allowed to use this technology from one province to
the next. For instance, only legal counsel and accredited members of the media
are allowed to use electronic devices to disseminate live text-based
communication from the courtrooms of Manitoba105 and the Northwest
Territories.106 Meanwhile, members of the public are not permitted to transmit
electronic information from inside the courtroom.107 The rules in Ontario are
slightly softer, as the Superior Court of Justice permits media, as well as counsel,
court staff, and members of the legal profession, to use electronic devices in the
103
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courtroom; however, members of the public can only do so with judicial
permission.108 There is consensus around at least one regulatory aspect: regardless
of region, no court observer in Canada—journalist or layperson—is allowed to
record audio or video of the proceedings or to take photographs in court without
prior judicial permission.
On May 15, 2014, Nova Scotia officially (albeit quietly) adopted one of the
most permissive policies on courtroom use of electronic devices in Canada.109
This new policy allows journalists and members of the public to bring electronic
devices, including laptops and cell phones into most Nova Scotia courts,
including the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, for the purposes of live
publishing or live communication, including texting, blogging, or tweeting.110 In
crafting this policy, Nova Scotia consciously decided against implementing a
more restrictive, ask-for-permission-first rule. Instead, the courts have placed the
onus on the presiding judge to implement, justify, and enforce any electronic
device ban.111 In less than one year, the use of Twitter in Nova Scotia courtrooms
has had a significant impact in the province. Case in point: its use during the
sexual assault trial of criminal defence lawyer Lyle Howe made national headlines
after Chief Justice Joseph Kennedy of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court lauded the
role of this technology in expanding the audience and the quality of the trial’s
coverage.112
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III. THE GOOD NEWS: JUSTIFYING DIGITAL MEDIA USE ON THE BASIS OF THE
OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE
A.

Accountability and Freedom of Information

Live-blogging in the courtroom by journalists and the public is supported
on the basis that it further demystifies the judicial process, which, despite the
open court principle, “remains shrouded in mysterious ritual” to the eyes of
many.113 As noted in Part I, the notion of transparency has long been entangled
with the integrity of the justice system, as the democratic legitimization of judicial
power flows from the public’s collective confidence in the legal system as an
impartial and independent arbiter of rights. For critics, exposing the courtroom
to a virtual audience would have the effect of promoting its accountability to both
the general public and to those associated with the case who were unable to attend
in person, including family and friends of the parties.114 The logic here is simple:
the more open that the process is in terms of witnesses and the more extensive
its public record, the less likely it is that judges and members of the court will
stray from the proper administration of justice. Support for live-blogging on the
basis of increased public oversight is evident in the words of Chief Justice
Kennedy, who welcomed digital media into Nova Scotia courtrooms by
acknowledging that the “whole premise [of the courts] is based on the fact that
we think an informed public will have confidence in [them]. We think that the
more they know, the better off we’re going to be. Twitter is the latest technology
that allows it.”115
The right to live-blog courtroom proceedings has also been cast as a
fundamental issue of access for those positioned outside the courtroom. As
digital media can provide information to citizens “with an immediacy and
thoroughness never before available,” anyone with Internet access can monitor a
trial as it unfolds without having to traverse the physical barriers that have long
kept courtrooms both paradoxically open and closed.116 Moreover, given that the
113
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information transmitted about the parties, witnesses, and action can far surpass
that of a traditional newspaper article or even a written judgment, the public may
be better equipped to make an informed and empathetic analysis of the case.
Sujoy Chatterjee explains: “An informed public that knows the names,
backgrounds, and socio-economic conditions of the people involved in…court
cases will be better equipped to critique a particular court decision in the hope of
creating real social change.”117 In this sense, social media’s ability to transmit vast
quantities of information, which can be augmented by links and images as
discussed in Part II, directly aligns with the democratic ideal of opening up the
courtroom for the world to see its contents and to judge its outcome. As Charles
Nesson eloquently puts it, tweeting and live-blogging can “facilitate [the] coveted
ideal [of the open court principle] and allow the whispers, now made in the inner
rooms of our public courthouses, to be proclaimed from the digital roof tops for
all to hear.”118
B.

Freedom of Expression: Open Court Meets Court of Public Opinion

Conversely, live-blogging during a court proceeding has also been
championed as a right of access for those positioned inside the courtroom on the
basis of the freedom of expression guarantee under section 2(b) of the Charter.
Specifically, section 2(b) has been used to challenge any distinction between
journalists and non-journalists’ permitted use of digital media in court—a division
reinforced by some of the policies of different jurisdictions and at different levels
of court across Canada, as discussed in Part II. Though the debate in Canada
regarding discrimination of access in this regard is nascent, prominent media law
scholar Michael Geist has challenged the tendency to privilege the accredited
media’s right to live-blog court proceedings to the exclusion of all others on the
basis that it fundamentally conflicts with section 2(b)’s inclusive guarantee.
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According to Geist, the Ontario Superior Court’s ban on general public tweeting
is arguably unconstitutional:
Either everyone should be free to tweet or no one should…but to limit
“authorized tweeting” to a special group is “enormously problematic.”
[This ban] leaves journalism students, freelancers, bloggers, and
responsible citizens who wish to attend trials and communicate about
them in a situation that is likely to end in a violation of their rights….
Presumptively banned from using the same communications medium
as reporters, they can be kicked out if they try, and charged with
contempt. Under the Charter, “everyone” has the right to freedom of
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication.”119

Others have made equivalent arguments on section 2(b) grounds, noting that
what previously entitled journalists to act as the exclusive purveyors of courtroom
content was their hegemonic control over mass media in a print-based
economy.120 Since this hegemony has declined in the Internet’s wake, the justice
system, in upholding section 2(b), is correspondingly compelled to accommodate
a world in which everyone has an equal ability to report from the courts.121 In this
vein, critics have pointed out the capricious underpinnings of a ban on the
public’s live-blogging, contending that
…the policy is simply unfair and arbitrary. […] [I]n the case of
courtrooms, the access provided [to] journalists and non-journalists is
basically the same. Indeed, barring exceptional circumstances,
courtrooms are open to anyone who can get there. […] [I]mposing a
class structure on attendees in open court is untenable.122

Consequently, if information dissemination is held as a public service and not a
consumer good,123 and the media is accepted under section 2(b) as having no
freedom of expression rights in the courtroom over and above those of average
119
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citizens, distinctions drawn between the accredited media and the public may
indeed prove legally flawed.
Support for live-blogging courtroom proceedings and discrediting class
distinctions drawn in this regard also stems from a promotion of the model of
discursive democracy outlined above in Part I. Drawing on the work of theorists
including Lon Fuller, recall that the Supreme Court of Canada and legal scholars
such as Jeremy Waldron held that the fair functioning of the liberal democratic
order required civilian access to information and the attendant opportunity to
deliberate upon that information critically. Since critics like Waldron suggest the
law itself is a site of civic contestation and debate, public institutions like the
courts have an obligation to provide citizens with the information they need to
actively resist dominant judicial interpretations of their civic rights and
obligations. Though previously undiscussed, implicit in this argument is the
assumption that the public has access to communal sites of information exchange
in which they are able to freely engage in political and social debate regarding the
law without government interference or censorship.124
The Internet, in its ability to generate infinite knowledge and function as a
medium for human interaction free from temporal and spatial boundaries, has
been cast as the locus for civic debate in the 21st century.125 Generally, the
Internet is a sphere of inclusivity and unconstrained dialogue—elements critical
to a democratic system of information exchange and argument.126 In this light,
scholar Geoffrey Leane explains the Internet’s normative function as it relates to
deliberative discourse:
The grea[t] ambition for the Internet as a communicative medium is
that it can facilitate not only access to information and data but also
the possibility of narrative exchange and collective will formation—
the opportunity to become informed, to argue and to reach reasoned
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and rational positions which might become part of a public sphere
consensus.127

Through platforms like Twitter, which open up inclusive public space for the
exchange of information and perspectives, civilians may discover increased
opportunities “for political communication and engagement, for political
contestation—and thus for agency.”128 The emancipatory power of these online
communities are further evidenced by the fact that users can overcome traditional
barriers to political recognition, including race or gender, in the anonymous world
of online discourse.
If live accounts of trials are wellsprings for an informed citizenry, the online
public debate that encircles these virtual watering holes may subsequently enrich
“both the substantive positions of participants and also their political selves as
citizens.”129 As enthusiasm for deliberative democracy in liberal societies is
“driven by a perceived distance between the drives and motivations of citizens
and the political decisions made in their name,” live-blogging in all its
informational immediacy may be able to narrow the temporal distance between
lawmaker and subject, as the latter is able to instantly respond to the actions of
the former.130 Emphasizing the narrowing distance between the judge and the
public, Charles Nesson suggests:
[The] Internet can provide a vision of the future in which the court is
truly recognized as a public place. This is a concept that harkens back
to the original idea of trials from a foundational time of our nation,
when trials were the cent[re] of community activity….131

Thus, live-blogging may offer a nexus between conversations about the law both
inside and outside the walls of the courtroom, functioning as an inclusive and
interactive site for public debate not yet experienced in the often staid world of
discourse about the courts.
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IV. THE BAD NEWS: THE RISKS OF DIGITAL MEDIA USE IN THE COURTROOM
“When you’re trying to correct things through Twitter alone, it’s a losing battle from the
beginning. […] You end up chasing Tweets that spread faster than you can keep up; it’s like
putting toothpaste back in the tube, except the toothpaste is alive and didn’t like it in the tube
and is dreaming of Broadway.”132
—DAVID HOLMES

A.

Twitter and the Troubling Search for Truth

Despite these strong arguments in favour of live-blogging, problems
inherent in its use persist. First and foremost, the Supreme Court has held that
the open court principle fundamentally operates on the assumption that the
reporting of legal information will be done in an accurate and fair manner.133
Critics, in turn, have argued that this presumption is an indispensable element to
the practical operation of the open court principle, insofar as it relieves judges, in
the absence of countervailing evidence, of the onerous task of having to vet or
screen the integrity of the press when presiding in full view of the media.134 The
requirement for accurate reporting is undeniably crucial, as the Supreme Court in
Edmonton Journal recognized that truthful and clear reporting of the law’s content
is necessary for individuals to understand their legal obligations and entitlements.135 Likewise, returning to the analysis of the law through theorists such as
Fuller and Waldron, the clear manifestation of its content affords individuals the
critical capacity to apply the law to their own behaviour through self-governance,
and lends stability and predictability to the lives of citizens in a manner that
underscores their dignity as legal subjects capable of self-determination.
Nonetheless, in a media landscape where Twitter and other live-blogging
platforms act as frenetic sources of information, it is apparent that falsehoods will
be made in quantities and qualities never before seen, threatening public
132
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perception of the clarity and determinate nature of the law’s content. On a basic
level, misrepresentations may be made by accident and by anyone: a misquotation,
an incorrect name, or a detail that was to remain off the record. However, in the
great echo chamber of the Internet, these slips will nevertheless travel in large
circles, and critics warn that corrections—if they come—may not come in time
to prevent people from walking away with mistaken impressions of reality.136 On
a more malevolent level, those outside the accredited media may intentionally
circulate misinformation, as occurred recently when Oscar Pistorius’ supporters
took to social media to deliberately recast key facts during his trial for murder.137
Similarly, anonymous sources of information may take advantage of the lack
of oversight and accountability to skew facts in a manner beneficial to their point
of view, either by decontextualizing information to present it in a different light
or by emphasizing choice bits of information that are inflammatory outside of
the complete narrative.138 As these retweeted reframings could still be linked to
an established media source, a veneer of credibility may problematically gloss over
otherwise unreliable information.139 Lastly, between accident and intent lies a host
of other troubling states, including insufficient objectivity,140 voyeurism, gossip,
speculation,141 half-truths,142 and bare sensationalism.143 Whatever the method
and motive, the risk of distortion is real and the challenges of effectively
containing the viral spread of misinformation in large-scale social networks are
substantial.144
This problem raises a secondary concern involving individuals’ online truthseeking behaviour, or lack thereof. Simply put, as the Internet presents individuals
136
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with massive quantities of information, their filtering mechanisms—which are
premised on their preconceptions, biases, and prejudices—can often become
survivalist techniques. Geoffrey Leane explains:
Given the sheer quantity of information available in complex modern
societies and now relatively accessible in unprecedented quantities on
the Internet, information seekers typically need a filtering process that
renders incoming information reasonably manageable, comprehensible, and amenable to analysis. One can self-select filters to suit one’s
own needs, interests and preferences. But therein lies the corollary
problem of too much filtering.145

On the topic of “too much filtering,” technology critics have warned users about
the tunnel vision effect that the Internet has on individuals’ search for truth,
noting that while the
…advantage of technology is that it allows people to filter information
and customize their selection, this advantage at the same time limits
people’s exposure. Because the Internet allows users to visit websites
that are very specialized and often geared towards specific audiences,
the Internet eliminates an element of randomness, reduces exposure
to a variety of views and perspectives, and potentially creates a biased
worldview.146

As individuals’ egocentrism may dominate their online information-seeking
behaviours, their freedom to “self-select…information sites, news and opinions
[may] simply confirm [their] prejudices and [cause them to] become more
politically segregated and intolerant.”147
On this point it is important to emphasize that critics see the self-filtering
nature of online information as a break from traditional news media of the past.
For instance, Leane writes:
Modern mass media have traditionally served as filtering devices and,
whilst self-selecting themselves, at least exposed readers and viewers
to some variety of perspectives in, for example, editorial pages of print
media. We may choose our newspaper and preferred editorial writers
145
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on the basis of our personal predilections but our attention might still
be caught by others. […] There is at least the possibility of inadvertent
exposure to contrary arguments and opinions. Not so with pre-chosen
Internet sites if one so wishes.148

Returning to the context of truth-seeking in the midst of misinformation,
individuals are unlikely to recognize a falsehood if they do not seek or gain
exposure to alternative perspectives and narratives. Therefore, misinformation
about the law will be increasingly rooted in the social discourse of live-blogging,
as it meets the radical grounds for confirmation bias laid by the Internet.
When competing narratives emerge for a single court proceeding, it may be
difficult to discern fiction from fact, particularly as the information travels further
away from its original source. In the context of the open court principle, reliance
on live-blogging and Twitter as mechanisms for dissemination thus troublingly
places the truth-seeking function of the open court principle in direct tension
with its deliberative function. The problem is deceptively simple: the more
opportunity there is to create multiple narratives regarding judicial proceedings,
the more likely it is that misinformation will be produced and that mistakes will
be made. As a result, the ability for individuals to self-govern on the basis of legal
determinacy, which the publicity principle is supposed to ensure, is fundamentally
weakened, as the deliberative conversation surrounding the law amplifies.
Furthermore, the problem begs a choice as to which critical facet of the open
court principle deserves to be privileged: is it the self-determinative function,
which underscores individuals’ human dignity in their self-governance, or is it the
self-deliberative function, which underscores individuals’ human dignity in their
engagement in public debate and action?
For theorists like Waldron, the conflict between legal clarity and public
conversation arising from the publicity principle comes as little surprise and offers
little resolution. Waldron explicitly highlights how these dual values of democratic
order can come into tension with one another, writing that the argumentative
nature of deliberative democracy “has a price: it probably brings with it a
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diminution in law’s certainty.”149 Elsewhere, Waldron explicitly brings Fuller into
the fold, asserting:
The tension may be also represented as a tension between various
strands of dignity associated with the Rule of Law. Fuller, we saw,
associated his formal criteria with a dignitarian conception of the legal
subject as an agent capable of monitoring and freely governing his own
conduct. […] But how, it may be asked, can we maintain this mode of
respect if law becomes contestable and uncertain as the result of
argumentation? Insisting on an opportunity for argumentation
respects dignity too but at the cost of diminishing the confidence that
we can have in the dignity of law’s self-application at the hands of
ordinary individuals.150

Importantly, in Waldron’s account there does not appear to be any way in which
the deliberative and determinative dimensions of informational freedom can be
reconciled. By way of conclusion, he notes:
To say that we should value aspects of governance that promote the
clarity and determinacy of rules for the sake of individual freedom, but
not the opportunities for argumentation that a free and self-possessed
individual is likely to demand, is to slice in half, to truncate, what the
Rule of Law rests upon: respect for the freedom and dignity of each
person as an active intelligence.151

Consequently, the formal qualities of clarity, predictability, and determinacy
simply bend with the “positive freedom” of individuals to actively engage in the
administration of public affairs.152 It is this bending of the truth to accommodate
deliberate discourse that appears particularly acute in the context of digital media
in the courtroom, as the free flow of information presents itself in all its possibility
and forbiddance in this novel form of publicity.
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Publication Bans and Lingering Challenges of Free Expression

Barring digital media use from the courtrooms on the basis that it obscures
the truth by creating multiple and potentially divergent narratives is deeply
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the Supreme Court in Mentuck held that once
information has entered the public domain of the courtroom, access to
disseminate this information should be denied only where its publication would
present a real and substantial risk to the proper administration of justice (e.g. a
risk to the accused’s section 11(d) Charter right to a fair trial), and where the
salutary effects of denying access outweigh the deleterious effects.153 In framing
this common law test for imposing a publication ban, the Supreme Court held
that the risk to the administration of justice must be grave and non-speculative; a
generalized assertion of a risk,154 or a fear based on “common sense and logic
alone, without the benefit of real and substantial evidence,”155 is not sufficient.
Finally, under this test, the Supreme Court concluded that publication bans
should be ordered only in exceptional cases.156
This threshold for publication bans—meant to uphold freedom of speech
in relation to the open court principle—is thus unquestionably high. To this end,
the test may pose issues in jurisdictions like Nova Scotia where live-tweeting is
presumptively allowed, but where the judge has concerns that a truthful account
of its proceedings may be obscured, distorted, or lost in the volley of tweeting.
Such circumstances may arise during highly controversial or sensational cases,
where media scrutiny and public attendance are atypically intense. In these
circumstances, implementing a ban on publication via digital media based on a
desire to preserve a ‘correct’ or uncontested narrative might not rise beyond the
level of speculative evidence of harm to the administration of justice. This would
be an untenable ground on which to exercise judicial discretion under the
Dagenais/Mentuck test.157 Moreover, given the fact that sensational, high-stakes
153
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criminal cases attract most publicity, the judge may be simultaneously under
pressure to allow extensive trial coverage to ensure the accused’s right to a fair
trial under section 11(d) of the Charter.
Secondly, judicial attempts to ban social media use on the basis that it leads
to multiple, contestable narratives may attract suspicion of censoring the public’s
freedom of speech. Such bans have been strongly criticized by scholars as
obstructionist and self-interested. It is important to see that judicial decisions are,
in the words of Elaine Craig, “normative—they make a claim to truth. ‘Every
judicial narrative is a claim of knowledge. […] When judges narrate, our initial
reaction is to treat their narration as an accurate reflection of reality.’”158 As a
result, in a scathing critique of the justice system’s attempt to limit trial
information to the ultimate judgment at the expense of alternative media’s
involvement, Charles Nesson wrote:
The courts are trying to contain the news. The courts are trying to
manage the content released to the world. The courts are trying to
create their vision of trial—a vision of an isolated proceeding in which
a record is carefully crafted and submitted as truth. This record
provides justification for the judicial result and is ideally not vulnerable
to media assaults along the way. The courts are trying to avoid the
commenting and critiquing that comes with sensational trial[s]; they
are trying to avoid the talking heads.159

Based on these concerns, judges may find themselves in uncomfortable positions
as they attempt to harness digital media’s potential, while avoiding unjust
infringements on free speech. Thus, out of concern for similar cries of
obfuscation or censorship of section 2(b)’s freedom of expression, judges may be
The trial judge granted the application on the condition that the media not broadcast certain portions of
the tape showing Smith’s actual death, but on appeal the Ontario Court of Appeal held that this was an
impermissible attempt to control the content of speech outside the courtroom. At para 50 the Court held
that “absent any finding of potential harm or injury to a legally protected interest, there is nothing in the law
that permits a judge to impose his or her opinion about what does not need to be broadcast to the general public. That would
be inconsistent with the constitutional protection our legal order accords freedom of expression and
freedom of the press” [emphasis added]. While this case was about televising trial exhibits, it nonetheless
underscores that freedom of expression seemingly limits a judge’s ability to control the judicial narrative in
the hands of others.
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forced to cede control over the flow of information in a manner that makes them
“just a participant in a connective community, rather than the person in control
of a legal process.”160 Consequently, while the fight may be waged between the
normative value of the law’s content and the discursive nature of its debate in the
context of the open court principle, freedom of speech under section 2(b) may
be the ultimate trump card, particularly in circumstances where the courts have
already brought digital media technologies into the fold.

V. CONCLUSION AND LOOKING AHEAD
Ultimately, the unsettled future of digital media in Canadian courtrooms and
the patchwork quilt of policies that have sprung up to address judicial concerns
in its regard point to the profoundly disruptive potential that this technology has
for the justice system. This technology is not, as some critics suggest, merely an
extension of pen and paper journalism. It is a new way of thinking about
information dissemination—both within and beyond the courtroom—and
provides an unrivalled ability to disseminate larger quantities of information to an
awaiting public, at a speed and with a sense of immediacy that far surpasses
conventional media. It is a form of dissemination that has serious benefits,
particularly in its ability to open the courts up to public scrutiny and to demystify
proceedings by ensuring more individuals are able to witness a trial unfold before
their eyes and at their fingertips. Attempts to stifle the integration of digital media
in the courtroom are thus met with valid resistance on the basis of public
accountability and accessibility, norms which are at the heart of both the legal
system and the democratic system of governance to which it belongs.
At the same time, inherent in digital media’s promises are its problems,
especially its fundamental ambivalence regarding the open court principle as the
source of both legal clarity and contestation. Accordingly, in deciding whether to
allow digital media use in the courtroom, the justice system may need to decide
which of the longstanding normative values supporting the open court principle
ought to be given decisive weight in modern society. It remains unclear how this
quandary will be reconciled, as the current patchwork quilt of policies regarding
160
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digital technology use in Canadian courtrooms suggests that consensus
surrounding this choice is elusive.
What is clear, however, is that digital media technology has a profound
ability to both complement and complicate the administration of justice in novel
ways. As Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin eloquently stated,
The open courtroom remains as essential today as it was in Bentham’s
time. Yet the omnipresent and immediate reach of modern dissemination networks makes it increasingly apparent that openness may exact
costs—costs that require judges and the media to reassess the means
by which they further the principle of open justice.161

Regardless of the outcome, an analysis of the open court principle and all its
pressing practical concerns in the context of digital media helps, as Jeremy
Waldron has written, to “bring our conceptual thinking about the law to life”:
There is a distressing tendency among academic legal philosophers to
see law simply as a set of normative propositions and to pursue their
task of developing an understanding of the concept of law to consist
simply in understanding what sort of normative propositions these are.
But law comes to life in institutions. An understanding of legal systems
that emphasizes argument in the courtroom as much as the existence
and recognition of rules provides the basis for a much richer
understanding of the values and requirements that law and legality
represent in modern political argument.162

The open court principle, as it currently stands in practice, demonstrates these
nuanced and contextual intersections between theory and practicality as it relates
to the deployment of legal institutions on a ground level. For this reason, the
open court principle provides an incredibly rich and ongoing topic of conversation, and one that will continue to evolve in the coming years.
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